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 
Abstract—This article shows how fundamental higher-order 
theories of mathematical structures of computer science (e.g. 
natural numbers [Dedekind 1888] and Actors [Hewitt et. al. 1973]) 
are categorical meaning that they can be axiomatized up to a 
unique isomorphism thereby removing any ambiguity in the 
mathematical structures being axiomatized. Having these 
mathematical structures precisely defined can make systems more 
secure because there are fewer ambiguities and holes for 
cyberattackers to exploit. For example, there are no infinite 
elements in models for natural numbers to be exploited. On the 
other hand, the 1st-order theories of Gödel’s results necessarily 
leave the mathematical structures ill-defined, e.g., there are 
necessarily models with infinite integers.  
Cyberattackers have severely damaged national, corporate, and 
individual security as well causing hundreds of billions of dollars 
of economic damage. [Sobers 2019] A significant cause of the 
damage is that current engineering practices are not sufficiently 
grounded in theoretical principles. In the last two decades, little 
new theoretical work has been done that practically impacts large 
engineering projects with the result that computer systems 
engineering education is insufficient in providing theoretical 
grounding. If the current cybersecurity situation is not quickly 
remedied, it will soon become much worse because of the projected 
development of Scalable Intelligent Systems by 2025 [Hewitt 2019].  
Gödel strongly advocated that the Turing Machine is the 
preeminent universal model of computation. A Turing machine 
formalizes an algorithm in which computation proceeds without 
external interaction. However, computing is now highly 
interactive, which this article proves is beyond the capability of a 
Turing Machine. Instead of the Turing Machine model, this article 
presents an axiomatization of a universal model of digital 
computation (including implementation of Scalable Intelligent 
Systems) up to a unique isomorphism. 
 
Index Terms—categorical theories, strong types, Scalable 
Intelligent Systems, Alonzo Church, Kurt Gödel, Richard 
Dedekind  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The approach in this article is to embrace all of the most 
powerful tools of classical mathematics in order to provide 
mathematical foundations for Computer Science. 
Fortunately, the results presented in this article are technically 
simple so they can be readily automated, which will enable 
better collaboration between humans and computer systems. 
Mathematics in this article means the precise formulation of 
standard mathematical theories that axiomatize the following 
standard mathematical structures up to a unique isomorphism:  
Booleans, natural numbers, reals, ordinals, sets, computable 
procedures, and Actors, as well as the theories of these 
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structures. 
In a strongly typed mathematical theory, every proposition, 
mathematical term, and program expression has a type where 
there is no universal type Any. Types are constructed bottom 
up from mathematical types that are individually categorically 
axiomatized in addition to the types of a theory being 
categorically axiomatized as a whole. 
[Russell 1906] introduced types into mathematical 
theories to block paradoxes such as The Liar  which could 
be constructed as a paradoxical fixed point using the 
mapping p↦p, except for the requirement that each 
proposition must have an order beginning with 1st-order.  
Since p is a propositional variable in the mapping, p has 
order one greater than the order of p. Thus because of orders 
on propositions, there is no paradoxical fixed point for the 
mapping p↦p which if it existed could be called I’mFalse 
such that I’mFalse ⇔I’mFalse. Unfortunately in addition to 
attaching orders to propositions, [Whitehead and Russell 
1910-1913] also attached orders to the other mathematical 
objects (such as natural numbers), which made the system 
unsuitable for standard mathematical practice. 
II. LIMITATIONS OF 1ST-ORDER LOGIC 
Wittgenstein correctly proved that allowing the proposition 
I'mUnprovable [Gödel 1931] into mathematics [Russell and 
Whitehead 1910-1913] infers a contradiction as follows:  
“Let us suppose [Gödel 1931] was correct and therefore] I 
prove the unprovability (in Russell’s system) of [Gödel's 
I'mUnprovable] P; [i.e., ⊢Russell ⊬Russell P where 
P⇔⊬Russell P] then by this proof I have proved P [i.e., 
⊢Russell    P because P⇔⊬Russell   P]. Now if this proof were 
one in Russell’s system [i.e., ⊢Russell ⊢Russell P] — I 
should in this case have proved at once that it belonged [i.e., 
⊢RussellP] and did not belong [i.e., ⊢Russell P because 
P⇔⊢Russell P] to Russell’s system. But there is a 
contradiction here! [i.e., ⊢Russell P and ⊢Russell P] ... 
[This] is what comes of making up such propositions.” 
[emphasis added] [Wittgenstein 1978] 
    Gödel made important contributions to the 
metamathematics of 1st-order logic with the countable 
compactness theorem and formalization of provability. 
[Gödel 1930] However decades later, Gödel asserted that the 
[Gödel 1931] inferential undecidability results were for a 1st-
order theory (e.g. like [Paulson 2014]) instead of the theory 
Russell [Russell and Whitehead 1910-1913] as originally 
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stated in [Gödel 1931]. In this way, Gödel dodged the point of 
Wittgenstein’s criticism. 
    Technically, the result in [Gödel 1931] was as follows: 
              Consistent[Russell]⇨⊢Russell ⊬Russell P  
where P⇔⊬RussellP and Consistent[Russell] if an only if 
there is no proposition  such that ⊢Russell⋀, 
However, Wittgenstein was understandably taking it as a given 
that Russell is consistent because it formalized standard 
mathematical practice and had been designed to block known 
paradoxes (such as The Liar) using orders on propositions. 
Consequently, Wittgenstein elided the result in [Gödel 1931 to 
⊢Russell⊬RussellP. His point was that Russell is 
consistent provided that the proposition ⊢Russell ⊬Russell P 
is not added to Russell. Wittgenstein was justified because 
the standard theory of natural numbers is arguably consistent 
because it has a model. [Dedekind 1888] 
    According to [Russell 1950]: “A new set of puzzles has 
resulted from the work of Gödel, especially his  article 
[Gödel 1931], in which he proved that in any formal system 
[with recursively enumerable theorems] it is possible to 
construct sentences of which the truth [i.e., provability] or 
falsehood [i.e., unprovability] cannot be decided within the 
system. Here again we are faced with the essential necessity 
of a hierarchy [of sentences], extending upwards ad 
infinitum, and logically incapable of completion.” [Urquhart 
2016] Construction of Gödel’s I’mUnprovable is blocked 
because the mapping ↦⊬Ψ does not have a fixed point 
because the order of ⊬Ψ is one greater than the order of  since 
 is a propositional variable. 
    Although 1st-order propositions can be useful (e.g. in 1st-
order proposition satisfiability testers), 1st-order theories are 
unsuitable as the mathematical foundation of computer science 
for the following reasons: 
 Compactness Every 1st-order theory is compact [Gödel 
1930] (meaning that every countable inconsistent set of 
propositions has a finite inconsistent subset). Compactness 
is false of the standard theory of natural numbers for the 
following reason:  if k is a natural number then the set of 
propositions of the form i>k where i is a natural number is 
inconsistent but has no finite inconsistent subset, thereby 
contradicting compactness. 
 Monsters Every 1st-order theory is ambiguous about 
fundamental mathematical structures such as the natural 
numbers, lambda expressions, and Actors [Hewitt and 
Woods assisted by Spurr 2019].  For example,  
o Every 1st-order axiomatization of the natural numbers 
has a model with an element (which can be called ∞) for 
a natural number, which is a “monster” [Lakatos 1976] 
because ∞ is larger than every standard natural number. 
o Every 1st-order theory T that can formalize its own 
provability has a model M with a Gödelian “monster” 
element  that proves T inconsistent (i.e. ⊨
M
⊢T⋀) 
by the following proof:  According to [Gödel 1931], 
⊬TConsistent[T] and consequently because of the 1st-
order model “completeness” theorem [Gödel 1930] there 
must be some model of T in which Consistent[T] is 
false. [cf. Artemov 2019] 
Such monsters are highly undesirable in models of 
standard mathematical structures in Computer Science 
because they are inimical to model checking. 
 Inconsistency This article shows that a 1st-order theory that 
can formalize its own provability is inconsistent. 
 Intelligent Systems. If a 1st-order theory is not consistent, 
then it is useless because each and every proposition (no 
matter how nonsensical) can be proved in the theory.  
However, Scalable Intelligent Systems must reason about 
massive amounts of pervasively-inconsistent information. 
[Hewitt and Woods assisted by Spurr 2019] Consequently, 
such systems cannot always use 1st-order theories. 
Conversational Logic [Hewitt 2016-2019] needs to be used 
to reason about inconsistent information in Scalable 
Intelligent Systems. [cf. Woods 2013] 
Consequently, Computer Science must move beyond 1st-
order logic for its foundations. 
 
III. STRONG TYPES 
Types must be strong to prevent inconsistency but flexible 
to allow all valid inference. (See appendix on how known 
paradoxes are blocked.) Although mathematics in this 
article necessarily goes beyond 1st-order logic, standard 
mathematical practice is used. Wherever possible, 
previously used notation is employed. The following notation 
is used for types: 
 The notation x:t  means that x is of type t . For example, 0:N 
expresses that 0 is of type N, which is the type of a natural 
number. Types differ from sets in that types are intensional, 
i.e., if x:t
1
 and x:t
2
 for every x does not mean that t
1
=t
2
 
where t
1
 and t
2
. are types. 
 t
2
t1 is type of all functions from t
1 
into t
2
 where 
t
1
 and t
2
. are types. A function is total and may be 
uncomputable. For example, NN is the type all total 
functions from natural numbers into the natural 
numbers, which are uncountable. If f:NN, then f[3] is the 
value of function f on argument 3. 
 t
1
→t
2
 is type of computable procedures from t
1
 into t
1
 
where t
1
 and t
2
 are types. A computable procedure can be 
partial and can be indeterminate in its outcome. For 
example, [N]→N is the type all partial procedures of one 
argument (which is a natural number) into the type of 
natural numbers. If p:[N]→N, then p∎[3] starts a 
computation by providing input [3] to procedure p. It 
might happen that p∎[3] does not return a value.  
Similarly anAccount∎deposit[$5] sends a deposit 
message to the Actor anAccount.  
 [t 1,t2]  is type of pairs of  t1 and t2 where t1 and t2 are types. 
For example, [N, Boolean] is the type of pairs whose first 
is a natural number and whose second is a Boolean. 
 TypeOf  t   is the type of t where t  is a type. For example, 
N:TypeOfN  meaning that N is of type TypeOfN   
producing an infinite hierarchy of types of types somewhat 
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like the hierarchy of universes in [Martin-Löf 1998]. There 
is no type Type  thereby blocking Girard’s paradox [Girard 
1972, Martin-Löf 1998].   
 PropositionOfOrderi is type of a proposition of 
order i where i:N
+
 and N
+
 is the type of positive natural 
numbers. For example, PropositionOfOrder1 is the 
type of propositions of order 1. 
 t ∋P is the type of t restricted to P where t is a type and P is 
a predicate. For example, replacement for types is 
expressed using restriction, i.e., the range of a function f:t
2
t1 
is t
2 
∋λ[y:t
2
] ∃[x:t
1
] y=f[x]. 
Types are constructed bottom-up from types that are 
categorically axiomatized up to a unique isomorphism. Type 
checking is linear in the size of the propositon, 
mathematical term or procedural expression to be type 
checked.  See appendix for syntax of propositions, 
mathematical terms, and procedural expressions. 
IV. STANDARD THEORIES OF COMPUTER SCIENCE 
 
Cybersecurity requires that fundamental  mathematical 
structures in Computer Science must be precisely defined. 
This section shows how to precisely define natural numbers.  It 
is followed by a section on how to precisely define Actors, 
which are the fundamental abstraction of computation. 
    The mathematical theory Nat that axiomatises the Natural 
Numbers has the following axioms building on [Dedekind 
1888]: 
• 0:N                                      // 0 is of type N  
• +1:NN                               // +1 (successor) is of type NN 
•  ∄[i:N] +1[i]=0                              // 0 is not a successor 
•  ∀[i,j:N] +1[i]=+1[j] ⇨ i=j       // +1 is 1 to 1 
 
In addition, Nat has the following induction axiom, which has 
uncountable instances: 
     ∀[i:N
+
, P:PropositionOfOrder NatiN] 
                   (P⟦0⟧  ∀[i:N] P⟦j⟧⇨P⟦+1[j]⟧) ⇨ ∀[j:N] P⟦j⟧ 
For example, if P is a 1st-order predicate, i.e., 
P:PropositionOfOrder Nat 1N then, the following is a 
proposition of order 2: 
                (P⟦0⟧  ∀[j:N] P⟦j⟧⇨P⟦+1[j]⟧) ⇨ ∀[j:N] P⟦j⟧ 
Note that the above proposition can be used in an induction 
axiom of order 2 to produce a proposition of order 3, etc. 
 
MetaNat 
MetaNat is a meta theory of Nat for proving theorems 
about Nat which directly expresses provability of a 
proposition  in Nat using ⊢Nat. (Gödel numbers cannot 
be used to represent propositions because there are not 
enough Gödel numbers to represent all uncountably many 
propositions that are instances of the induction axiom.) 
 
Procedures of Nat 
Evalt :[Expression t  in Environment ]→t  is a 
procedure [McCarthy et. al. 1962] that corresponds to a 
universal Turing machine [Church 1936] as follows: 
o Evalt  ∎[x:Expression t ] ≡  
                                                 Evalt ∎[x in EmptyEnvironment] 
o Evalt  l∎[x:Identifiert  in e:Environment] ≡  
          Lookup[x in e] 
o Evalt2  ∎[operator∎operand in e:Environmment ] ≡ 
    (Evalt1→t2 ∎[operator in e])∎(Evalt1∎[operand in e]) 
          // apply the value of operator to  
                 // the value of operand 
o Evalt1→t2 ∎[(λ x1 body)  in e:Environmment ] ≡ 
          λx2:t1 Eval∎[body in Bind∎[x1 to x2 in e]] 
                     // eval body in a new environment with x1 bound 
                            // to x2 as an extension of e 
In order to implement recursion, the lambda calculus has the 
primitive Fix such that ∀[F:Functionalt
1
,t
2
]  
                                              Fixt
1
,t
2
∎[F]= F∎[Fixt1,t2∎[F]]  
where Functional t
1
,t
2
 ≡ [[t
1
]→t
2
]→([t
1
]→t
2
) 
  
Proof Checkers in Nat  
A proof checker pc:ProofCheckerNat is a provably total 
boolean-valued procedure of two arguments that checks if the 
second argument is validly inferred from the first argument.   
The following notation (which is part of the theory Nat) means 
that pc is proof checker such that proposition 1 infers 
proposition 2 in Nat:  1⊢
pc
Nat 
 2 such that:  
  ∀[1,2:PropositionNat]  
     (1⊢Nat2) ⇔ ∃[pc:ProofCheckerNat]  1⊢
pc
Nat 
 2 
Proof checking in Nat is computationally decidable because: 
  ∀[1,2:PropositionNat], pc:ProofCheckerNat] 
     (1⊢
pc
Nat 
 2) ⇔ pc∎[1,2]=True 
where pc∎[1,2] means the invocation of procedure pc with 
arguments 1 and 2. For example, there is a Chaining for 
Inference checker such that if 1 is ⋀ (⊢
pc
Nat 
 ), then 
ChainingForInferenceChecker∎[1,2]=True if 2= and 
pc∎[,]=True, otherwise pc∎[1,2]=False as follows: 
    ChainingForInferenceChecker∎[1,2] ≡ 
         1 if ⊢
pc
 Nat
  then 2= and pc∎[,]=True, 
                           else False 
The proof checker for the induction axiom is as follows: 
       InductionChecker∎[,2] ≡ 
         1 if  (P⟦0⟧  ∀[i:N] P⟦i⟧⇨P⟦+1[i]⟧)  
                       then 2 = ∀[i:N] P⟦i⟧, 
                             else False 
Note that InductionChecker correctly checks uncountably many 
instances of each of the Nat induction axioms. 
    There are uncountable proof checkers in Nat which is 
made possible because proof checkers can operate on higher 
order types, e.g., they are not restricted to strings.    For 
example, there are uncountable proof checkers of the form 
ForAllEliminationCheckert [c] where t  is a type and c:t 
such that 
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           ForAllEliminationCheckert [c]∎[1,2] ≡ 
               1 if (∀[x:t ] P[x]) then 2=P[c], else False 
Consequently,  
         (∀[x:t ] P[x]) ⊢
ForAllEliminationChecker𝑡[c] 
Nat
 P[c]      
Inferential soundness means that a theorem in Nat can be used 
in proofs in Nat. A consequence of Inferential Soundness is 
that unrestricted cut-elimination does not hold for Nat. 
    Theorem: Inferential Soundness of Nat, i.e.,  
                                ⊢MetaNat ∀[:PropositionNat]  
                                                                                (⊢Nat ) ⊢Nat  
   Proof.  Follows immediately from the rule TheoremUse, 
i.e.,  (⊢Nat ) ⊢
TheoremUse 
Nat
   
    Theorem: Deduction for Nat, i.e.,  
                               ⊢MetaNat ∀[,:PropositionNat] 
                                                                         (⊢Nat ⇨) ⇔ (⊢Nat)  
Proof Suppose ⊢Nat⇨ and consequently ⇨ by 
Inferential Soundness.  Further suppose . Then  by 
ChainingForImplication and consequently ⊢Nat by 
InferenceIntroduction.  
    On the other hand suppose ⊢Nat.  Further suppose 
. Then  by ChainingForInference and consequently 
⊢Nat⇨ by ImplicationIntroduction. 
Theorem Inferential Adequacy, i.e.,  
          ∀[:PropositionNat] (⊢Nat)⇨⊢Nat⊢Nat 
 Proof: Suppose ⊢Nat. Let ⊢
pc1
Nat 
  so that 
pc1∎[]=True. Then a provably total procedure pc2: 
ProofCheckerNat can be defined such that 
pc2∎[⊢
pc1
Nat 
]=True meaning that ⊢
pc2
 Nat
⊢
pc1
Nat 
. 
Consequently, ⊢Nat⊢Nat. 
 
Unique Categoricity of  Nat 
   Theorem [Dedekind 1888]: If M be a type satisfying the 
axioms of Nat, then there is  a unique isomorphism I with N 
defined as follows:   
• I:MN 
• I[0] ≡ 0
M
 
• I[+1[j]] ≡ +1
𝑀
[I[j]] 
I is a unique isomorphism because of the following; 
• I is defined on N 
• I is 1-1 
• I is onto M 
• I is a homomorphism 
o I[0] ≡ 0
M
 
o ∀[i:N] I[+1[j]] ≡ +1
𝑀
[I[j]] 
• I-1 is a homomorphism 
o I-1[0
M
] = 0 
o ∀[y:M] I-1[+1
𝑀
[y]] = +1[I-1[y]] 
• If g is an isomorphism of N with M, then g=I 
    Corollary There are no infinite numbers in models of the 
theory Nat, i.e., if M satisfies the axiom of Nat, then 
                       ∄[j:M] ∀[i:N] i < j 
 
Computational and Inferential Undecidability of Provability 
in Nat 
The predicate Halt can be defined as follows:  
        Halt[x:Expression N] ≡ ∃[y:N] y=Eval∎[x] 
    Theorem. Halt is computationally undecidable [Church 
1935, Turing 1936], i.e.,  
      ∄[h:[ExpressionN]→Boolean ] 
           ∀[x:Expression  N] h∎[x]=True ⇔ Halt[x] 
Proof. Suppose to obtain a contradiction that 
h:[ExpressionN]→Boolean  and  
∀[x:Expression  N] h∎[x]=True ⇔ Halt [x]. Define 
Diagonal as follows: 
Diagonal∎[ ] ≡ 
    h∎[Diagonal∎[ ]] if True then LoopForever∎[ ] else 0 
Because Halt[LoopForever∎[ ]], by the definition of 
Diagonal, h∎[Diagonal∎[ ]]=False meaning that 
Diagonal∎[ ]=0 by the definition of Diagonal. 
Consequently h∎[Diagonal∎[ ]]=True which is a 
contradiction. 
    Theorem. Whether a proposition is a theorem of  Nat is 
computationally undecidable [Church 1935, Turing 1936], 
i.e., ∄[d:[PropositionNat]→Boolean ] 
           ∀[:PropositionNat] d∎[]=True ⇔ ⊢Nat 
          Proof. Follows immediately from the computational 
undecidability of the halting problem because of the 
following: 
         ∀[x:ExpressionN] HaltN[x] ⇔ ⊢Nat HaltN[x] 
   Theorem.  Nat is inferentially undecidable, i.e., 
                               ⊢MetaNat∃[:Proposition Nat]  
                                                         (⊬Nat) ⋀ (⊬Nat) 
Proof Suppose to obtain a contradiction that Nat is 
inferentially decidable and consequently 
           ∀[x:Expression  N]  
                 (⊢Nat HaltN[x]) ⋁ (⊢NatHaltN[x]) 
Since only countably many instances of the natural 
number induction axiom could have been used in the 
above proofs, the halting problem is computationally 
decidable by computationally enumerating the 
proofs, which is a contradiction. 
In practice, computational  and inferential undecidability of 
provability, do not impose limitations on the ability to prove 
theorems for mathematical theories of Intelligent Systems. 
    Definition:  P predicateOnNat t ⇔ 
                               ∃[i:N
+
] P:PropositionOfOrder Nati
t
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Unique categoricity of Types and Propositions of  Nat 
    The following induction axiom holds for propositions of 
Nat, which has uncountable instances: 
((∀[P predicateOnNat Proposition Nat) 
   (∀[t
 
:TypeIn Nat; x1,x2:t] P⟦x1=x2⟧ 
          ∀[t
1
,t
2
:TypeIn Nat; x:t
2
] P⟦x:t⟧ 
           ∀[:PropositionNat] P⟦⟧⇨P⟦⟧ 
           ∀[1,2:PropositionNat] 
                                                          P⟦1⟧⋀P⟦2⟧⇨P⟦1⋀2⟧ 
           ∀[t
 
:TypeIn Nat; Q predicateOnNat t  ]  
                                         (∀[x:t ] P⟦Q⟦x⟧⟧)⇨P[∀[x:t ] Q⟦x⟧])) 
        ⇨ ∀[:PropositionNat] P[] 
    Theorem. PropositionNat is characterized up to a 
unique isomorphism. 
    The following axioms hold for TypeIn Nat (the type 
of types in Nat) because types are intensional: 
• N:TypeIn Nat 
• ∀[i:N
+
]PropositionOfOrderNati:TypeIn Nat 
• ∀[t
1
,t
2
,t
3
,t
4
:TypeIn Nat]  
              [t 1,t2]=[t 3,t4] ⇨ t1=t2 ⋀ t3=t4   
•  ∀[t1,t2,t3,t4:TypeIn Nat] t1t2=t3t4⇨ t1=t2 ⋀ t3=t4 
• ∀[t
1
,t
2
,t
3
,t
4
:TypeIn Nat]  
                t
1
→t
2
=t
3
→t
4
  ⇨ t
1
=t
2 
⋀ t
3
=t
4
   
• ∀[t
1
,t
2
:TypeIn Nat;  
     P1 predicateOnNat t1, P2 predicateOnNat t2] 
                   t
1
∋P1=t2∋P2 ⇨ t1=t2 ⋀ P1=P2 
• ∀[t
1
,t
2
:TypeIn Nat]  
                    TypeOf t
1
=TypeOf t
2
 ⇨ t
1
=t
2 
For example, N
N:TypeIn Nat, etc. 
    The following induction axiom holds, which has 
uncountable instances: 
   ∀[P predicateOnNat TypeIn Nat] 
       (P⟦N⟧  
            ∀[t
1
,t
2
:TypeIn Nat] P⟦t
1
⟧⋀P⟦t
1
⟧⇨P⟦[t 1,t2]⟧ 
            ∀[t
1
,t
2
:TypeIn Nat] P⟦t
1
⟧⋀P⟦t
2
⟧⇨P⟦t1t2⟧ 
            ∀[t
1
,t
2
:TypeIn Nat] P⟦t
1
⟧⋀P⟦t
2
⟧⇨P⟦t
1
→t
2
⟧ 
            ∀[t :TypeIn Nat, Q predicateOnNatt ] 
                                       P⟦t⟧⇨P⟦t ∋Q⟧ 
 ∀[i:N
+
] P[PropositionOfOrderNati⟧  
           ∀[t :TypeIn Nat ] P⟦t ⟧⇨P⟦TypeOf t ⟧) 
         ⇨ ∀[t :TypeIn Nat] P⟦t ⟧ 
    Theorem Unique categoricity of TypeIn Nat, i.e., if M 
is a type satisfying the theory Nat, then there is  a unique 
isomorphism I between TypeIn  Nat and  
TypeIn 
M
Nat defined as follows:   
• I[N] ≡ N
M
 
• I[[t 1,t2]] ≡ [I[t 1], I[t2]]M 
• I[t1
t2
] ≡ I[t1]I[
t2]
 
• I[t
1
→t
2
] ≡ I[t
1
]→ I[t
2
] 
• I[TypeOf t ] ≡ TypeOf 
M
I[t ]   I[t ∋P] defined by 
Induction on TypeIn  Nat using the following cases 
on t: 
o N then I[t ∋P] ≡ N
M
∋
M
 [y] P⟦I-1[y]⟧ 
o [t 1,t2] then I[t ∋P] ≡ [I[t 1], I[t2]]M ∋M [y] P⟦I-1[y]⟧ 
o t1
t2
 then I[t ∋P] ≡ I[t1]I[t2] ] ∋
M 
[y] P⟦I-1[y]⟧ 
o t
1
→t
2
 then I[t ∋P] ≡ I[I[t
1
]→ I[t
2
]] ∋
M 
[y] P⟦I-1[y]⟧ 
o TypeOf t
1
  then  
             I[t ∋P] ≡ TypeOf 
M
 I-1[t
1
]∋
M 
[y] P⟦I-1[y]⟧ 
o t
1
 ∋P1 then I[t ∋P] ≡ I[t1] ∋M [y] P⟦I-1[y]⟧⋀P1⟦I-1[y]⟧ 
 
Nat is algorithmically inexhaustible 
That all the theorems of a theory can be obtained by 
computationally enumerating them from axioms has long 
been a default assumption of philosophers of logic. However, 
the theory Nat violates this assumption because there are 
uncountable instances of the induction axiom. Uncountability 
of raises the following question:  What axioms of Nat can be 
expressed in text, i.e., in the theory Nat↾String, i.e., Nat 
abstracted from strings. Nat↾String has the following 
induction axiom, which has countable instances because 
strings are countable: 
         ∀[i:N
+
, P:(PropositionOfOrder NatiN)↾String ] 
                           (P⟦0⟧  ∀[j:N] P⟦j⟧⇨P⟦+1[j]⟧) ⇨ ∀[j:N] P⟦j⟧ 
    Definitions.  
 Total t
1
, t
2
 ≡ (t
1
→t
2
)∋[f] ∀[x:t
1
] ∃[y:t
2
] f∎[x]=y 
 ProvedTotal Nat↾Stringt1, t2 ≡  
       (t
1
→t
2
)↾String ∋[f]⊢Nat↾String f:Totalt1,t2 
 Onto t
1
, t
2
 ≡ (t
1
→t
2
)∋[f] ∀[y:t
2
] ∃[x:t
1
] f∎[x]=y 
    Theorem. Theorem Nat↾String   is computationally 
enumerable, i.e., there is a procedure Theorems such that  
          Theorems:Onto [N], Theorem Nat↾String   
Corollary. ProvedTotal Nat↾String is computationally 
enumerable, i.e., there is a procedure ProvedTotals such that 
           ProvedTotals:Onto [N], ProvedTotal Nat↾String. 
   Definition. Define the procedure Diagonal as follows: 
    Diagonal∎[i:N] ≡ 1+(ProvedTotals∎[i])∎[i] 
   Lemma. Diagonal:ProvedTotal Nat↾String 
Proof. Suppose i:N. Let  
f:ProvedTotal Nat↾String=ProvedTotals∎[i] and let  
j:N=f∎[i]. Therefore Diagonal∎[i]=1+j. Consequently, 
⊢Nat↾String Diagonal:Total [N], N . 
    Lemma. Diagonal:ProvedTotal Nat↾String 
Proof. Diagonal differs from every procedure 
enumerated by ProvedTotals. 
    Theorem. Nat↾String   is inconsistent [Church 1934], i.e., 
                   ∃[:Proposition Nat↾String  ] ⊢Nat⋀  
Proof. Let =Diagonal:ProvedTotal Nat↾String 
    The upshot is that Nat is algorithmically inexhaustible, 
i.e., nonalgorithmic creativity will be forever required to 
develop new Nat  axioms abstracted from strings thereby 
reinforcing the intuition behind [Franzén, 2004]. According 
to [Church 1934], inconsistency of Nat↾String  means that 
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“there is no sound basis for supposing that there is such a thing 
as logic.” Contrary to [Church 1934], the conclusion in this 
article is to abandon the assumption that theorems of a 
theory must be computationally enumerable while retaining 
the requirement that proof checking must be 
computationally decidable. 
     
 
V. ACTOR MODEL 
 
[Church 1932] and [Turing 1936] developed a model of 
computation time based on the concept of an algorithm, which 
by definition is provided an input from which it is to compute a 
value without external interaction. After physical computers 
were constructed, they soon diverged from computing only 
algorithms meaning that the Church/Turing theory of 
computation no longer applied to computation in practice 
because computer systems are highly interactive as they 
compute. Actors [Hewitt, et. al 1973] (axiomatized in this 
article) remedied the omission to provide for scalable 
computation. An Actor machine can be millions of times faster 
than any corresponding pure Logic Program or parallel 
nondeterministic  expression. Since the time of this early work, 
Actors have grown to be one of the most important paradigms 
in computing [Hewitt and Woods 2019; Milner 1993]. 
Of course, earlier work made huge pioneering contributions: 
 expressions [Church 1932] play an important role in 
programming languages. Turing Machines [Turing 1936] 
inspired development of the stored program sequential 
computer and Logic Programs are fundamental to Scalable 
Intelligent Systems. [Hewitt 2019] 
 
Computation that cannot be done by  Calculus, 
Nondeterministic Turing Machines, or pure Logic Programs 
Actor machines can perform computations that a no  
expression, nondeterministic Turing Machine or pure Logic 
Program can implement. Below is an example of a very simple 
computation that cannot be performed by a nondeterministic 
Turing Machine: 
There is an always-halting Actor machine that can compute 
an integer of unbounded size. This is accomplished using an 
Actor with a variable count that is initially 0 and a variable 
continue initially True. The computation is begun by 
concurrently sending two messages to the Actor machine: a stop 
request that will return an integer n formalized as Output[n] and 
a go message that will return Void. 
The Actor machine operates as follows: 
 When a stop message is received, return count and set 
continue to False for the next message received. 
 When a go message is received:  
o If continue is True, increment count by 1, send this 
Actor machine a go message in a hole of the region 
of mutual exclusion, and afterward return Void.  
o If continue is False, return Void. 
    Theorem. There is no  expression, nondeterministic 
Turing Machine, or pure Logic Program that implements the 
above computation.     
Proof [Plotkin 1976]: 
“Now the set of initial segments of execution sequences of 
a given nondeterministic program P, starting from a given 
state, will form a tree. The branching points will 
correspond to the choice points in the program. Since there 
are always only finitely many alternatives at each choice 
point, the branching factor of the tree is always finite. That 
is, the tree is finitary. Now König's lemma says that if 
every branch of a finitary tree is finite, then so is the tree 
itself. In the present case this means that if every execution 
sequence of P terminates, then there are only finitely many 
execution sequences. So if an output set of P is infinite, it 
must contain a nonterminating computation.” 
Limitations of 1st-order Logic for Concurrent Computation 
Theorem. It is well known that there is no 1st-order theory for 
the above Actor machine.  
Proof. Every 1st-order theory is compact meaning that every 
inconsistent set of propositions has a finite inconsistent 
subset. Consequently, to show that there is no 1st-order 
theory, it is sufficient to show that there is an inconsistent 
set of propositions such that every finite subset is consistent. 
Let Output[i] mean that i is output.  
Proposition  Nat∋[] ∃[i:N] =Output[i] is 
inconsistent but every finite subset S is consistent because 
the Actor machine output might be larger than any output 
in S. 
    Actors have fundamentally transformed the foundations and 
practice of computation since the initial conceptions of Turing 
and Church. Although 1st-order propositions can be useful (e.g. 
in testing 1st-order propositions for satisfiability), message 
passing illustrates why 1st-order logic cannot be the foundation 
for theories in Computer Science. 
 
Actors in Practice 
An interface can be defined using an interface name, 
"interface", and a list of message handler signatures, where 
message handler signature consists of a message name followed 
by argument types delimited by "[" and "]", "→", and a return 
type. For example, the interface type ReadersWriter  can be 
defined as follows: 
   ReadersWriter interface  
          read[Query]→ ReadResponse, 
       write[Update ]→ WriteResponse  
Initial 
State
Next
State
Next
State
Next
State
Next
State
Nondeterministic Choice
             
continue := False
Integer
initially: continue=True, count=0
count 
go
stop
 count := count + 1 
Resend go message until stop message received
Void
Void
go
continue? 
TrueFalse
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Holes in regions of mutual exclusion 
    Holes in regions of mutual exclusion (Swiss cheese) [Hewitt 
and Atkinson 1979; Atkinson 1980] is a generalization of 
mutual exclusion with the following goals:   
 Generality:  Conveniently program any scheduling policy 
 Performance:  Support maximum performance in 
implementation, e.g., the ability to minimize locking and to 
avoid repeatedly recalculating a condition for proceeding. 
 Understandability:  Invariants for the variables of a 
mutable Actor should hold whenever entering or leaving 
the region of mutual exclusion. 
 Modularity:  Resources requiring scheduling should be 
encapsulated so that it is impossible to use them incorrectly. 
   Coordinating activities of readers and writers in a shared 
resource is a classic problem. The fundamental constraint is that 
multiple writers are not allowed to operate concurrently and a 
writer is not allowed to operate concurrently with a reader.  
    Below is a read priority implementation of a readers/writer 
scheduler for a database in which it is forbidden for a writer to 
operate concurrently with any other activity (cf. [Hoare 1974; 
Brinch Hansen 1996]): 
ReadPriority ⟦aDatabase:ReadersWriter ⟧ ↦ 
   #Local(#FIFO(writersQ,  readersQ), 
                                                                // queues of suspended activities 
                 #Crowd(reading),                     // crowd of active reading 
                 #AtMostOne(writing)),   // at most one writing 
   #Handler(getScheduler ↦ As myScheduler,  
              upgrade[newVersion] ↦  
                            #CancelAll(readersQ, writersQ, reading, writing) 
                                for Become newVersion) 
   myScheduler implements ReadersWriter #Handler(  
    read[aQuery] ↦  
     Enqueue readersQ  
                       when #SomeNonempty(writing, writersQ, readersQ)  
         for                                          // Require: #IsEmpty writing  
            Permit readersQ 
                   for  aDatabase∎read[aQuery] thru reading 
 
                               afterward             // Require: #IsEmpty writing 
 
                                    permit writersQ when IsEmpty reading  
                                                  else readersQ when  
                                                                #AllEmpty(writing, writersQ) 
      write[anUpdate] ↦     
     Enqueue writersQ when #SomeNonempty(reading,  
                                                           readersQ, writing, writersQ)   
          for                             // Require: #IsEmpty(writing , reading)   
                  aDatabase∎write[anUpdate] thru writing 
                afterward     // Require: #AllEmpty(writing , reading) 
                                       Permit readersQ else writersQ)
Note: 
1. At most one activity is allowed to execute in the region 
of mutual exclusion of ReadPriority.  
2. The region of mutual of exclusion has holes illustrating 
that an Actor is not a sequential process (thread) in 
which control moves sequentially through a program.  
3. An implementation, e.g. ReadPriority, differs from 
a class [Dahl and Nygaard 1967] as follows:  
 An implementation can use multiple other 
implementations using qualified names to prevent 
ambiguity [cf. ISO 2017]. 
  An implementation cannot be subclassed [Dahl and 
Nygaard 1967]  in order to prevent impersonation by 
other types. 
4. An invariant for an Actor must hold when it is created 
and when entering/leaving a continuous section of a 
region of mutual exclusion. 
    A ReadPriority implementation has the following 
invariant: 
                Nonempty[writing] ⇨ IsEmpty[reading] 
which holds because of Actor Induction as follows [Turing 
1949, Hewitt 2017-2019]: 
 The invariant holds when a ReadPriority 
implementation is created. 
 If the invariant holds in a  ReadPriority 
implementation when a communication is received, then it 
holds when leaving. 
    Starvation of activities suspended in readersQ and 
writersQ as is prevented in a ReadPriority implementation 
as follows: 
 An activity in readersQ progresses when 
1. A read to the database is started by another activity 
2. If  writersQ and writing are both empty after the read 
to the database is completed by another activity 
3. Else after the next write to the database is finished. 
 An activity in writersQ progresses when 
1. If readersQ is empty when a write to the database is 
completed by another activity 
2. Else when reading becomes smaller when reading the 
database is completed by another activity. 
    Reading throughput is maintained by permitting readersQ 
when another activity starts a read to the database. 
             
 readersQ
theResource∎write[aQuery] thru reading
 writersQ
theResource∎write[anUpdate] thru writing 
theResource∎read[aQuery] 
theResource∎write[anUpdate] 
read[aQuery]
write[anUpdate]
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Axiomatization of Actors up to a unique isomporphism 
Let x[e] be the behavior of Actor x at local event e, Com be the 
type for a communication, and Behavior be the type for a 
procedure that maps a communication received to an outcome 
that has a finite set of created Actors, a finite set of sent 
communications, and a behavior for the next communication 
received. 
    ActorTheory categorically axiomatises Actors using the 
following axioms where ↷  (read as “precedes”) is transitive 
and irreflexive and Info[x] is the information in the Actor 
addresses of x:  
 Primitive Actors 
o ∀[i:N]  i:Actor             // natural numbers are Actors 
o ∀[x1,x2:Actor ] [x1, x2]:Actor  
                                 // a 2-tuple of Actors is an Actor 
 An Actor’s event ordering 
o ∀[x:Actor, c:Com ] Initialx↷Receivedx[c]↷Afterx[c] 
o ∀[x:Actor, c1,c2:Com ]   
   c1≠c2 ⇒ (Receivedx[c1]↷Receivedx[c2]  
                                  ⋁ Receivedx[c2]↷Receivedx[c1]) 
o ∀[x:Actor, c:Com ]  
    ∄[c1:Com ]  Receivedx[c]↷Receivedx[c1]↷Afterx[c] 
 An Actor’s behavior change 
o ∀[x:Actor, c:Com ]   
    (∄[c1:Com ] Receivedx[c1]↷Receivedx[c]) 
                     ⇒ x∎received[c] = x∎initial 
o ∀[x:Actor, c1,c2:Com ]   
    (∄[c3:Com ]  
                    Afterx[c1]↷Receivedx[c3]↷Receivedx[c2]) 
            ⇒ x∎received[c2] = x∎after[c1] 
o ∀[x:Actor, c:Com ] Finite[Com ∋[s] s∈x.sent[c]] 
o ∀[x:Actor, c:Com ]  
    Info[x∎created[c]]  
            ⊑ Info[c]⊔Info[x∎received[c]]⊔Info[x∎new[c]] 
o ∀[x:Actor, c:Com ]  
    Info[x∎new[c]]⊓(Info[c]⊔Info[x∎received[c])=⊥ 
       // info about addresses of newly created Actors 
        // does not provide any information about 
        // addresses of existing Actors 
o ∀[x:Actor, c:Com ] Info[x∎created[c]] 
             Let processing = (Info[c]⊔Info[x∎received[c]] 
                                                     ⊔Info[x∎created[c]]) 
                      // processing is information about addresses 
                    // that is in c, available in the Actor when  
                    // c was received and in Actors created 
                    // while processing c            
                 in (Info[x∎after[c]]⊑processing  
                       ⋀ Info[x∎sent[c]]⊑processing)        
 Discreteness of Actors event ordering 
             ∀[e1, e2:Event ] Finite[Event ∋[e]  e1↷e↷e2] 
                   // There are only finitely many events  
                    // in ↷ between two events. 
 Actor Induction 
  ∀[x:Actor, P predicateOn Behavior] 
      (P⟦x∎initial⟧  ∀[c:Com ]  
                                         P⟦x∎received[c]⟧⇨P⟦x∎after[c]⟧) 
         ⇨ ∀[c:Com ] P⟦x∎received[c]]⟧  P⟦x∎after[c]]⟧ 
 
    Note that the above axioms do not require that every 
communication sent must be received.  However, ActorScript 
[Hewitt and Woods assisted by Spurr 2015] provides that every 
request will either throw a TooLong  exception or respond 
with the response sent to its customer.    Theorem. Unique 
Categoricity of ActorTheory, i.e., if M is a type satisfying 
the axioms for ActorTheory, then there is  a unique 
isomorphism between M and Actor. 
    Thesis: Any digital system can be directly modeled and 
implemented using Actors. 
 
In many practical applications, the parallel λ-calculus and 
pure Logic Programs can be thousands of times slower than 
Actor implementations. 
 
VI. MATHEMATICAL THEORIES OF COMPUTER SCIENCE 
 
Standard Mathematical Theories of Computer Science 
Although theorems of mathematical theories in higher order 
logic are not computationally enumerable, proof checking  is 
computationally decidable. Strong types can be used 
categorically axiomatize [Hewitt 2017-2019] up to a unique 
isomorphism a mathematical theory T for the model M for each 
of the following: Natural Numbers, Real Numbers, Ordinals, 
Computable Procedures, and Actors with the following 
properties: 
 T is categorical for M, i.e., if X satisfies the axioms of T, 
then is X isomorphic to M by a unique isomorphism. 
 T is not compact 
  Indiscernibles for T, i.e.,  
  ∀[t
 
:TypeIn T; x1,x2:t] 
         (∀[P:PropositionOfOrderT1
t]P⟦x1⟧⇔P⟦x2⟧]) ⇨ x1=x2 
 ⊦
p
𝐓
  is computationally decidable for :PropositonT 
       and p:ProofCheckerT 
 
Information Invariance 
Information Invariance is a fundamental technical goal of logic 
consisting of the following: 
1. Soundness of inference: information is not increased by 
inference 
2. Completeness of inference: all valid inferences are 
included. 
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Criteria for Mathematical Foundations 
Computer Science brought different concerns and a new 
perspective to mathematical foundations including the 
following requirements (building on [Maddy 2018]): 
 Practicality is providing powerful machinery so that 
arguments (proofs) can be short and understandable and  
 Generality is formalizing inference so that all of 
mathematics can take place side-by-side.  Strong types 
provide generality by formalizing theories of the natural 
numbers, reals, ordinals, set theory, groups, lambda 
calculus, and Actors side-by-side. 
 Shared Standard of what counts as legitimate mathematics 
so people can join forces and develop common techniques 
and technology. According to [Burgess 2015]: 
“To guarantee that rigor is not compromised in the 
process of transferring material from one branch 
of mathematics to another, it is essential that the 
starting points of the branches being connected ... 
be compatible. ... The only obvious way ensure 
compatibility of the starting points ... is ultimate 
to derive all branches from a common unified 
starting point.” 
    This article describes such a common unified starting 
point including natural numbers, reals, ordinals, sets, 
groups, geometry, algebra, lambda calculus, and Actors that 
are axiomatized up to a unique isomorphism. 
 Abstraction so that fundamental mathematical structures 
can be characterized up to a unique isomorphism including 
natural numbers, reals, ordinals, sets, groups, lambda 
calculus, and Actors. 
 Guidance is for practioners in their day-to-day work by 
providing relevant structures and methods free of extraneous 
factors. This article provides guidance by providing strong 
parameterized types and intuitive categorical inductive 
axiomatizations of natural numbers, ordinals, sets, lambda 
calculus, and Actors. 
 Meta-Mathematics is the formalization of logic and rules 
of inference. The mathematical theories described in this 
article facilitate meta-mathematics because inference is 
directly on propositions without having to be coded as 
integers as in [Gödel 1931]. 
 Automation is facilitated in  this article by making type 
checking very easy and intuitive along as well as 
incorporating Jaśkowski natural deduction for building an 
inferential system that can be used in everyday work. 
 Risk Assessment is the danger of contradictions emerging 
in classical mathematical theories. This article formalizes 
long-established and well-tested mathematical practice 
while blocking all known paradoxes. (See appendix on 
paradoxes.) Confidence in the consistency of Nat and 
ActorTheory is based on the way that they are 
inductively constructed bottom-up.  
 Monsters [Lakatos 1976] are unwanted elements in 
models of classical mathematical theories. ActorTheory 
precisely characterizes what is digitally computable leaving 
no room for “monsters” in models. Having a model up to a 
unique isomorphism in classical mathematical theories is 
crucial for cybersecurity. 
   Intuitive categorical inductive axiomatizations of natural 
numbers, propositions, types, ordinals, sets, lambda calculus, 
and Actors promote confidence in operational consistency.  
     Consistent mathematical theories can be freely used in 
(inconsistent) empirical theories without introducing additional 
inconsistency. 
 
VII. CYBERSECURITY CRISIS 
    The current disastrous state of cybersecurity [Sobers 2019,  
Perlroth, Sanger and Shane 2019] cries out for a paradigm shift 
away from 1st-order logic (the basis of Gödel’s results discussed 
in this article) as the foundation for mathematical theories of 
Computer Science because of the following deficiencies: 
 unwanted monsters in models of theories 
 inconsistencies in theories caused by compactness 
 being able to infer each and every proposition (including 
nonsense) from an inconsistency in an empirical theory even 
though it may not be apparant that the theory is inconsistent. 
Thus Computer Science must move beyond the consensus 
claimed by [G. H Moore 1988] as follows: “To most 
mathematical logicians working in the 1980s, first-order 
logic is the proper and natural framework for 
mathematics.”   
    According to [Kuhn 2012], 
“The decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously 
the decision to accept another. First, the new candidate must 
seem to resolve some outstanding and generally recognized 
problem that can be met in no other way. Second, the new 
paradigm must promise to preserve a relatively large part of 
the concrete problem solving activity that has accrued to 
science through its predecessor ...  
        At the start, a new candidate for paradigm shift may have 
few supporters, and on occasions supporters’ motives may be 
suspect. Nevertheless, if they are competent, they will 
improve it, explore its possibilities, and show what it would 
be like to belong to the community guided by it. And as that 
goes on, if the paradigm is one destined to win its fight, the 
number and strength of the persuasive arguments in its favor 
will increase. More scientists will then be converted, the 
exploration of the new paradigm will go on. Gradually, the 
number of experiments, instruments, and books upon the 
paradigm will multiply... 
        Though a generation is sometimes required to effect the 
shift, scientific communities have again and again been 
converted to new paradigms. Furthermore, these conversions 
occur not despite the fact that scientists are human but 
because they are. ... Conversions will occur a few at a time 
until, after the last holdouts have died, the whole profession 
will again be practicing under a single, but now different 
paradigm.”
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    The necessity to give up a long-held intuitive assumption 
has often held back the development of a paradigm shift. For 
example, the Newtonian assumption of absolute space-time had 
to be given up in the theory of relativity.  Also, physical 
determinacy had to be abandoned in quantum theory. According 
to [Church 1934]:   
“Indeed, if there is no formalization of logic as a whole [i.e.  
theorems are not computationally enumerable], then there is 
no exact description of what logic is, for it in the very nature 
of an exact description that it implies a formalization. And if 
there no exact description of logic, then there is no sound 
basis for supposing that there is such a thing as logic.” 
Contrary to [Church 1934], the conclusion in this article is 
to abandon the assumption that theorems of a theory must 
be computationally enumerable while retaining the 
requirement that proof checking must be computationally 
decidable. 
    The Establishment has made numerous mistakes during 
paradigm shifts. For example, Arthur Erich Has derived the 
radius of the ground state of the hydrogen atom [Haas 1910], 
anticipating Niels Bohr work by 3 years. Yet in 1910 Haas’s 
article was rejected and his ideas were termed a “carnival joke” 
by Viennese physicists. [Hermann 2008] On the other hand, 
Enrico Fermi received the 1938 Nobel prize for the discovery 
of the nonexistent elements “Ausonium” and “Hesperium”, 
which were actually mixtures of barium, krypton and other 
elements. [Fermi 1938] 
    How the Computer Science cybersecurity crisis will 
proceed is indeterminate, including the following 
possibilities. 
  muddle along without fundamental change 
 shift to something along the lines  proposed in this article 
 shift to some other proposal that has not yet been devised 
Cybersecurity issues can provide focus and direction for 
fundamental research in Computer Science. 
 
VII. RELATED WORK 
Recent work has centered on constructive type theory which has 
type t
1
→t
2
, which is the type of computable procedures t
1 
into 
t
2
, but does not have t
2
t1
, which is the type of all functions from 
t
1 
into t
2
. Also, constructive type theory relies on 
Propositon T=Theorem T with the unfortunate 
consequence that type checking is computationally 
undecidable and it is difficult to reason about unprovable 
propositions.  
    Extensions of Isabelle/HOL [Gordon 2016] seem more 
suitable for formalizing classical mathematics than 
constructive type theory. 
  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This article strengthens the position of working mathematicians 
as follows: 
 Providing usable theories of standard mathematical 
theories of computer science (e.g. Natural Numbers and 
Actors) such that there is only one model up to a unique 
isomorphism. The approach in this article is to embrace 
all of the most powerful tools of classical mathematics 
in order to provide mathematical foundations for 
Computer Science. Fortunately, these foundations are 
technically simple so they can be readily automated, 
which will enable improved collaboration between 
humans and computer systems. 
 Allowing theories to freely reason about theories 
 Providing a theory that precisely characterizes all digital 
computation as well as a strongly-typed programming 
language that can directly, efficiently, and securely 
implement every Actor computation. 
 Providing in foundation for well-defined classical theories 
of natural numbers and Actors for use in reasoning by 
theories of practice in Scalable Intelligent Systems that are 
(of necessity) pervasively inconsistent. 
Blocking known paradoxes makes classical mathematical 
theories safer for use in Scalable Intelligent Systems by 
preventing security holes. Consistent strong mathematical 
theories can be freely used without introducing additional 
inconsistent information into inconsistency robust empirical 
theories that will be the core of future Intelligent 
Applications. 
    Inconsistency Robustness [Hewitt and Woods assisted by 
Spurr 2015] is performance of information systems (including 
scientific communities) with massive pervasively-inconsistent 
information. Inconsistency Robustness of the community of 
professional mathematicians is their performance repeatedly 
repairing contradictions over the centuries. In the Inconsistency 
Robustness paradigm, deriving contradictions has been a 
progressive development and not “game stoppers.” 
Contradictions can be helpful instead of being something to be 
“swept under the rug” by denying their existence, which has 
been repeatedly attempted by dogmatic theoreticians (beginning 
with some Pythagoreans). Such denial has delayed 
mathematical development. 
    For reasons of computer security, Computer Science must 
abandon the thesis that theorems of fundamental mathematical 
theories must be computationally enumerable. This can be 
accomplished while preserving almost all previous 
mathematical work except the 1st-Order Thesis [Barwise 1985]. 
Automation of the proofs in this article is within reach of the 
state of the art which will enable better collaboration 
between humans and computer systems. 
     Having a powerful system is important because computers 
must be able to formalize all logical inferences (including 
inferences about their own inference processes) so that 
computer systems can better collaborate with humans.  
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APPENDIX: MATHEMATICAL NOTATION 
Notation for mathematical propositions, mathematical terms, 
and procedural expressions is formalized in this appendix. 
 
Mathematical Proposition is a discrimination of the 
following patterns: 
o 1, 12:PropositionOfOrderi where  
1,2:PropositionOfOrderi and i:N+ 
o (x1=x2):PropositionOfOrder1 where  
x1,x2:Term t   and t  is a type  
o  (x:t ):PropositionOfOrder1 where t  is a type 
o P⟦x⟧:PropositionOfOrderi+1 where  
x:Term t  , t  is a type and  
P:Term Proposition it and i:N
+
 
o (1⊦2):PropositionOfOrderi where i:N+ and 
1,2:PropositionOfOrderi  
o (1├
p
 2):PropositionOfOrderi where  
p:Term ProofChecker, and 
1,2:PropositionOfOrderi and i:N+ 
o s:PropositionOfOrderi (abstraction of 
   s) where s:PropositionOfOrderi↾String with no 
    free variables, and i:N
+ 
 
Mathematical Proposition from String  is a discrimination 
of the following patterns: 
o “"" s1”,“s1 "" s2”:PropositionofOrderi↾String 
where s1,s2:PropositionofOrderi↾String and i:N+ 
o “x1"="x2”: PropositionofOrder1↾String where  
where x1,x2:Term↾String 
o “x1 ":" x2”: PropositionofOrder1↾String where 
x1,x2:Term↾String  
o “"∀[" x ":" t "]" s”:PropositionofOrderi+1↾String 
where t is a type, x:Variablet  ↾String  and 
s:PropositionofOrderi↾String 
o “P "⟦" x "⟧"”: PropositionofOrderi+1↾String 
where x:Term t ↾String, i:N
+
 and 
P:Term PropositionofOrder it ↾String  
o “s1"⊦"s2”: PropositionofOrderI+1↾String where  
s1,s2:PropositionofOrderi↾String,  and i:N+. 
o “s1 "├"
p
 s2”:PropositionofOrderi+1↾String 
where p:TermProofChecker ↾String, 
s1,s2:PropositionofOrderi↾String,, and i:N+  
o  “"" s ""”:PropositionofOrderi↾String is  
    abstraction of s where  
       s:PropositionofOrderi↾String with no free  
     variables, and i:N
+
Mathematical Term is a discrimination of the following 
patterns: 
o Boolean :ConstantTypeOf Boolean ,  
N:ConstantTypeOf N , and  
Actor :ConstantTypeOf Actor  
o x:Term t    where x:Constantt   and t  is a type 
o x:Term t   where x:Variable t   and  
t  is a type 
o [x1, x2]:Term [t1, t2] where x1:Term t1,   x2:Term 
t
2
, and t
1
 and t
2
 are types 
o (x1 if True then x2 , False then x3):Term t  where 
x1:Term Boolean , x2,x3:Term t  and t  is a type 
o (λ[x:t
1 ] y):Term t2
t1
 where x:Variablet
1
, 
y:Termt
2
 and t
1
 and t
2
 are types 
o f[x]:Term t
2
 where f:Term t
2
t1
,  
x:Term t
1
, and t
1
 and t
2
 are types 
o x :Term t   is abstraction of x where  
    x:Term t   ↾String  and t  is a type 
 
Procedural Expression is a discrimination of the following: 
o x:Expression t    where x:Constantt   and t  is a 
type 
o x:Expression t   where x:Identifier t   and  
t  is a type 
o [e1, e2]:Expression [t1, t2] where  
e1:Expression t1, e2:Expression t2, and  
t
1
 and t
2
 are types 
o (e1 if True then e2 , False then e3):Expression t  
where e1:Expression Boolean ,  
e2,e3:Expression t  and t  is a type 
o (λ[x:t
1 ] y):Expressiont1→t2 where 
x:Identifiert
1
, y:Expressiont
2
 and t
1
 and t
2
 
are types 
o x∎m:Expression t2 where m:Expression t1, x is 
an Actor with a message handler with signature of 
type Expression t
1
→t
2
, and t
1
 and t
2
 are types 
o I⟦x1, ..., xn⟧:Expression I  where I is an Actor 
implementation and x1, ..., xn are expressions. 
o x :Expression t   is abstraction of x where  
    x:Expression t   ↾String  and t  is a type 
 
APPENDIX: MATHEMATICAL PARADOXES 
Inconsistencies in fundamental mathematical theories of 
Computer Science are dangerous because they can be used 
to create security vulnerabilities. Strong types are extremely 
important because they block all known paradoxes including 
the ones in this appendix. 
 
Russell [Russell 1902] 
o Russell’s paradox for sets is resolved as follows: the type 
of all sets restricted to ones that are not elements of 
themselves is just the type of all sets because no set is an 
element of itself. 
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o Russell’s paradox for predicates is resolved as follows: 
The mapping P↦P⟦P⟧ has no fixed point because P⟦P⟧ 
has order one greater than the order of P because P is a 
predicate variable. 
 
Curry [Curry 1941]  
Curry’s Paradox is blocked because the mapping p↦p⇒Ψ 
does not have a fixed point because the order of p⇒Ψ is 
greater than the order of p since p is a propositional variable. 
 
Löb [Löb 1955]  
Löb’s Paradox is blocked because the mapping p↦((├p)⇒Ψ) 
does not have a fixed point because the order of (├p)⇒Ψ is 
greater than the order of p since p is a propositional variable. 
Yablo [Yablo 1985] 
Yablo’s Paradox is blocked because the mapping  
P↦[i:N]∀[j:N] j>i⇨P⟦j⟧ does not have a fixed point 
because the order of [i:N] ∀[j:N]j>i⇨P⟦j⟧ is greater than the 
order of P since P is a predicate variable [cf. Priest 1997]. 
 
Berry [Russell 1906] 
Berry’s Paradox can be formalized using the proposition  
Characterizei⟦s, k⟧ meaning that the string s characterizes 
the integer k as follows where i:N
+
: 
 Berryi ≡  (TermPropositionofOrderiN)↾String 
 Characterizei⟦s:Berryi,  k:N⟧  ≡ ∀[x:N] s  ⟦x⟧⇔ x=k 
    The Berry Paradox is to construct a string for the proposition 
that holds for integer n if and only if every string with length 
less than 100 does not characterize n using the following 
definition: 
   BerryString:Berryi+1 ≡ 
     “[n:N] ∀[s:PropositionOfOrderi↾String] 
                            Length[s]<100 ⇨ Characterizei⟦s, n⟧” 
  Note that 
o Length[BerryString]<100. 
o Berryi∋[s] Length[s]<100 is finite. 
o Therefore, BerryNumber  is finite where 
    BerryNumber  ≡  
                    N
+
∋[i] ∃[s:Berry i] 
                                    Length[s]<100  Characterizei⟦s, i⟧ 
o ∃[i:N
+
] i:BerryNumber  because is N
+
 is infinite. 
o LeastBerry ≡ Least[BerryNumber ]  
o  BerryString ⟦LeastBerry⟧ =   
                      ∀[s:Berryi]  
              Length[s]<100 ⇨ Characterizei⟦s, LeastBerry ⟧ 
However BerryString:Berryi+1  cannot be substituted 
for s:Berryi. Consequently, the Berry Paradox as follows 
does not hold: 
          BerryString ⟦LeastBerry⟧ 
                ⇔ Characterizei⟦BerryString, LeastBerry⟧
Gödel’s Ontological Argument  [Gödel  ~1941]  
Gödel’s Ontological Argument formulated as a strongly-
typed mathematical theory is inconsistent where a positive 
proposition is defined as follows: 
  Positive i ≡ PredicateOnPropositionOfOrderi 
                                                ∋[P] ∀[:PropositionOfOrderi] 
                                               P⟦⟧ ⇔ P⟦⟧ 
The beginning of Gödel’s argument can be expressed as a 
mathematical axiom as follows: 
  ∃[P1:Positive i] 
            ∀[P2:PredicateOnPropositionOfOrderi] 
              (P1:Positivei ⋀   ∀[:PropositionOfOrderi] 
                                                P1⟦⟧ ⇨ P2⟦⟧) 
               ⇨ P2:Positive i 
     Counterexample to axiom. Assume P1:Positive i.  
Define Always as follows: 
       Alwaysi⟦:PropositionOfOrderi⟧ ≡ = 
Therefore ∀[:PropositionOfOrderi]  
                            P1⟦⟧⇨Alwaysi⟦⟧ 
Consequently, by the axiom Alwaysi:Positive i, 
which is a contradiction. 
Therefore, Gödel’s argument is inconsistent as a classical 
mathematical theory.  Gödel intended for his argument to 
be formulated in model logic, which is outside the scope of 
this article. 
 
APPENDIX: ORDINALS 
Ordinals (denoted by type O) can be axiomatized up to a 
unique isomorphism in a theory called Ord [Hewitt 2016-
2019].   
Thesis. Ord is inferentially complete, i.e., all valid 
mathematical inference for classical mathematical theories 
can be carried out in Ord. (The thesis should be formalized 
as a mathematical theorem). 
    Let  be the least Ordinal of cardinality BooleanN. 
    Lemma. ⊦Ord ∀[:O] < ⇨ Countable[] 
Proof. Immediate from the definition of . 
Theorem.  Continuum Hypothesis for Ordinals, i.e., 
   ⊦Ord ∄[:O] ||<||<||, where  is the least Ordinal  
        of cardinality N and || is the cardinality of Ordinal .   
Proof. Follows immediately from the above lemma. 
Consequently, the opposite of the 1st-order Gödel/Cohen 
[Cohen 1963-1964] result holds for Ordinals. 
    The Continuum Hypothesis for Ordinals is the most 
important version of the Continuum Hypothesis for Computer 
Science. The version of the Continuum Hypothesis for untyped 
sets [cf. Kreisel 1967, page 152; Feferman 2011] is less 
important because Computer Science typically uses a mixture 
of lists (e.g. ListN ), sets (e.g. SetListN), trees, etc. 
parameterized by types instead of the ill-defined notion of an 
untyped set of sets. To defeat cyberattacks, SetTheory must 
be axiomatized up to a unique isomorphism. [cf. Hewitt 2017-
2019] 
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